TNAG-1087-FCO40-1337-Implications-for-Hong-Kong-of-changes-in-the-British-nationa-1982 — Page 55

SECRET

GRS 300

SECRET

DESKBY 300100Z

FM FCO 292005Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 OF 29 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING

FOR GOVERNOR FROM LPS

(450

451

464

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BUDHX

010/1

34503 - 1

8

(1982)

Hier 34011

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 51

ME

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DESK OFFICER

INDEX

PA

REGISTRY Action Taken

3-in

Pao Ju (465

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See (467)

468

YOUR TELNOS 973 AND 974 (NOW REPEATED TO PEKING):

NATIONALITY BILL

1. IT WAS VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE THIS ASSESSMENT. I UNDERSTAND WHY THE GOVERNMENTS FINAL DECISION ON GIBRALTAR (DETERMINED

BY PARLIAMENTARY TACTICS IN THE FACE OF ALMOST CERTAIN GOVERNMENT DEFEAT ON THE ISSUE) HAS CAUSED STRONG RESENTMENT IN HONG KONG AND I APPRECIATE THE PRESSURE FROM UMELCO, BUT AT LEAST WE MANEGED A

CRUMB OF COMFORT OVER THE SECOND GEDDES AMMENDMENT.

2. AS YOU KNOW. SIR PAUL BRYAN SPOKE ON THE LINES WHICH YOU

SUGGESTED ON 27 OCTOBER. MR WHITELAW DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY THEN

BUT UNDERTOOK TO WRITE TO SIR PAUL.

See

457

3. I HAVE ENSURED THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE FCO INVOLVEMENT THROUGHOUT

THIS EXERCISE, I FULL REALISE THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING AS MUCH REASSURANCE TO HONG KONG AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IT HAS PROVED NECESSARY FOR MR WHITELAW'S REPLY TO SIR PAUL BRYAN (WHICH WE WILL TELEGRAPH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE) TO BE IN GENERAL TERMS. YOU WILL

UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE PRECISA

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1466

FORECASTS ABOUT THE FUTURE POSITION OF BDTCS IN THE EVENT OF A

CHANGE IN THE TERRITORY'S STATUS. WE CANNOT SAY THAT A PARTICULAR

GROUP OF PEOPLE WOULD INDEFINITELY CONTINUE TO HOLD SOME FORM OF

BRITISH NATIONAL STATUS THIS WOULD BE DISHONEST AND WOULD

RAISE EXPECTATIONS UNJUSTIFIABLEY. MOREOVER, IN THE SPECIAL CASE OF

HONG KONG IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR HMG NOW TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT

ABOUT FUTURE CITIZENSHIP WHICH MIGHT TIE THEIR HANDS, POSSIBLEY TO

1

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