TNAG-1086-FCO40-1336-Implications-for-Hong-Kong-of-changes-in-the-British-nationa-1981 — Page 119

19/6424)

Ра

เน

10.

OCT 1981

MKK 346/1

Lad

251

уперси

CONFIDENTIA

NOX

MA

PS/LPS

个

The Home

Home Secretary accepted

proposal

the basis

of the

ма

Pan 20/10 latter alone

BRITISH NATIONALITY BILL : LORD GEDDES ' AMENDMENT ON CBDTS

1910.

420 1.

The LPS wrote to Mr Whitelaw about this on 16 October. As the Third Reading in the Lords is on 20 October and time is short, Mr Whitelaw may well telephone the LPS to discuss the question. Mr Atkins may wish to have some additional points for this.

2. Tactics for defeating the Gibraltar amendment. Acceptance of Lord Geddes' amendment to vary the CBDT title would be less a concession to Hong Kong than a means of bringing the word order into line with the other two main titles (British Citizen and British Overseas Citizen). It would not be such a concession to Hong Kong that removal of the Gibraltar amendment would become irrelevant. Indeed, opposition by HMG to the Geddes amendment could well irritate the Hong Kong lobby and cause them eg to abstain on the Gibraltar amendment in the Commons.

3

•

Substance of Lord Geddes' amendment.

It would not materially

alter the Bill and could give nothing away in immigration or other terms. It would appear as

a reasonable move and we could well have difficulty in defeating it in the Lords.

4. Concessions already made to Hong Kong. The Home Secretary's understanding of the problems of locally-engaged Crown Servants in the Dependent Territories and of the entitlement to register as British Citizens for CBDTS after residence in the UK was much appreciated. However, that came before the Gibraltar amendment which has materially altered the position.

5.

UK/Hong Kong relations. The worries of the Unofficials in Hong Kong are not over immigration rights nor for finding a bolt hole if things go wrong with China. They are interested in their present political position and in maintaining confidence for Hong Kong. Demonstration even if psychological of HMG's readiness to emphasise the link with the Territory is important here.

C

6. HMG's interest. This is not just a matter of pleasing a number of senior people in Hong Kong. Our own interests will suffer if confidence in Britain's interest and commitment slips. Relations with China could suffer. There are specific commercial interests in the form of big projects in which the Unofficials in Hong Kong have a say.

19 October 1981

Бир

R D Clift

Hong Kong and General Department

сс

Mr Howells, NTD

Mr Adams

Mr Donald

PS/Lord Trefgarne

CONFIDENTIAL