TNAG-1085-FCO40-1335-Implications-for-Hong-Kong-of-changes-in-the-British-nationa-1981 — Page 74

HOFO 16/01

PP F CO

GPS 160

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HONG KONG 010732Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

ADVANCE COPY

нки 34011

RECEIVED RISASIY No. 51

1 OCT 1981

DESK OFFICER

FIKASTRY

(384)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 878 OF 1 OCTOBER

754

INDEX

ло

FOR DONALD FROM GOVERNOR

75

YOUR TELNO 420: NATIONALITY BILL.

PA

Action Taken

146.60

Pero utro

See (341

375

THE PROPOSAL IN YOUR PARA 4 WOULD BE GOOD BECAUSE, TO SOME EXTENT,

IT MEETS OUR TWO BASIC REQUIREMENTS:

(A) THAT THE GIBRALTAR AMENDMENT IN THE BILL BE BALANCED BY SOMETHING ELSE IN THE BILL, REPEAT IN THE BILL, AND

381

Refers to

Fca lel

375 سلام

}

(B) IT TENDS TO EMPHASISE THE CONTINUING BRITISHNESS OF CBDTS. 2. IF THE HOME OFFICE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE OMISSION OF THE BRACKETS ROUND HONG KONG, I THINK WE SHOULD GO BACK TO PEKING. 1 DOUBT IF IT WOULD MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE TO THE CHINESE WHETHER

THERE WERE BRACKETS OR NOT.

3. ON REFLECTION I FEEL THAT THE OUTCOME IN PARA 4 WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO HONG KONG PEOPLE THAN THE REVERSAL OF THE GIBRALTAR

AMENDMENT.

4. MOREOVER THE WORST OUTCOME FOR HONG KONG WOULD BE AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT BY THE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE THE LORDS' AMENDMENT

REVERSED, AND FOR THERE THEN TO BE NO TIME TO INSERT THE ADDITIONAL CLAUSE AS IN YOUR PARA 4. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE TACTICALLY SOUND TO INDICATE TO THE HOME OFFICE THAT YOU WOULD ACCEPT THE AMENDMENT, RATHER THAN RISK THE UNCERTAINTY OF OPPOSING IT, IN RETURN FOR THE CLAUSE YOU SUGGEST.

5. WITH REGARD TO YOUR PARA 6, IT IS QUITE CLEAR TO US THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE NOTHING UNLESS IT 15 BACKED BY THE HOME OFFICE.

MACLEHOSE

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