TNAG-1083-FCO40-1333-Implications-for-Hong-Kong-of-changes-in-the-British-nationa-1981 — Page 34

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Mr Morrice, HK&GD

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Reference.

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NA DA Mr Wilkend 3

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cc Mr Adams

PS/Mr Luce

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AN ALGUTRY MO.

30 APR 1931

NATIONALITY BILL: THE PREFIX 'BRITISH (OR UK) NATIONAL STR

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1. I attach a minute setting out the principal objections that I see to Hong Kong's proposal. Despite Its length I have tried to stick to the main headings. There are other arguments

eg the confusion between the interpretation of nationals in individual treaties such as the Treaty of Rome with a different meaning from its proposed use in the Bill (which were included in the draft telegrams that we sent to HKGD last week). It is from those drafts, using certain points and developing others in relation to the latest telegrams from Hong Kong, that I believe that we could, as I say in paragraph 5 of the attached note, produce an explanation to Hong Kong why we cannot accept the proposal without calamitous results. I have not thought it necessary or desirable to rehearse all those arguments in the attached note. But if they were to go up in the submission I think you should cull from those earlier draft telegrams rather than use the wording which was in the draft submission you sent to me.

2. I realise that despite what I see as compelling bojections to Hong Kong's proposal Ministers may wish to say that they have put Hong Kong's views to the Home Secretary. I hope they can do so without saying that there is a crisis in Hong Kong which makes a response to meet Hong Kong's points essential. Though it is not my province I frankly find it difficult to believe that this crisis has suddenly blown up in Hong Kong and that there really is the strength of feeling which the Governor suggests in his telegram in the streets of Hong Kong amongst the non-travelling public about this title. It is surely not coincidence that the last two telegrams from Hong Kong, making their case most strongly, are timede coincide with our submission to the Secretary of State. I suspect that the proper valuation of them is that they are strategically timed to present the strongest case to the Secretary of State before a decision is taken and do not represent a new crisis.

Спаль

W Jones

Nationality and Treaty Department

29 April 1981

CONFIDENTIAL