TNAG-1081-FCO40-1331-Implications-for-Hong-Kong-of-changes-in-the-British-nationa-1981 — Page 216

F

SECRET

-4-

66,

10.

Our proposals to the Home Office should therefore be in such

a form as to:

a) reassure Hong Kong as much as possible;

b) be simple, avoiding multiple amendments;

c) discourage so far as possible a flood of early applications

from a wide range of people and reassure the Home Office that

this will not happen.

11. We should therefore start by explaining Hong Kong's maximum

demands as in paragraph 6, 7 and 11 of Hong Kong Telegram No 129.

We will not achieve these but the purpose is to demonstrate to Hong

Kong that we have put the totality of their points to the Home Office.

We should then move to a simple additional sub-clause to Schedule 1

as suggested in paragraph 7 but without amendment to Paragraph 1(3).

This would provide some assurance to Civil Servants and Unofficials

that they could be looked after in 'special circumstances' - ie a

Chinese take-over, but would be less likely to invite immediate

applications.

12. The Governor's request for additional assurance to Citizens

of the British Dependent Territories in the Bill is likely to meet

strong resistance from the Home Office.

We should therefore

suggest to the Home Office that this be covered in a separate

assurance by Ministers.

13. Even these diluted proposals may well run into difficulties

We may therefore have to fall back in the end on generalised assurances,

even for Crown Servants. But we should support the Governor strongly

in trying to get amendments to the Bill; officials should report again

to Ministers after discussion with the Home Office.

18 February 1981

Woun

R'D Clift

Hong Kong and General Department

SECRET