TNAG-1080-FCO40-1330-Implications-for-Hong-Kong-of-changes-in-the-British-nationa-1981 — Page 50

I

1

Mr Donald

Sir E Youde

SECRET

HITE 34011

REZIVED ANANYAY NO. 51

6 FEB 1981

DESK OFFICER

INDEX

(51

205

REGISTRY Action Taken

PA

всю 815

ہاری کا ملل

(4-8)

NEW NATIONALITY LEGISLATION: POSITION OF HONG KONG LOCALLY-ENGAGED CIVIL SERVANTS AND UNOFFICIALS

1.

The Secretary of State has written to Mr Whitelaw following his discussion with Sir S Y Chung and Mr O V Cheung. The Chief Clerk wishes to hold a meeting to discuss further action. This minute sums up the position. I suggest that it and the enclosure form an agenda for the meeting, after which we would prepare a submission for Ministers.

2.

We need to prepare for two contingencies:

a positive response to Lord Carrington's suggestion that officials should have talks, and a rejection. In either case we shall have to determine the priority which we will give to the various options open to us. The latter are set out in the attached note (agreed with NTD and Legal Adviser).

Action on the Bill

3. We should press the Home Office as hard as possible for a solution involving amendment to the Bill, if necessary taking it to Cabinet. The Governor considers that that would provide the best reassurance for Hong Kong. Moreover such an arrangement would be less likely to draw attention to the problem of the future and China's attitude to Hong Kong. We should try for a simple amendment to Schedule 1 Paragraph 1(3) with some form of discretionary option (see paragraph 3(b) of the paper) as an acceptable alternative. The proposal in paragraph 3(c) to offset Crown Service against the residence qualification for naturalisation would be largely cosmetic and only effective if linked to an assurance on entry.

Other Action

4.

Assurances

We have to recognise the political difficulty of getting effective amendments to the Bill. We may have to fall back on an assurance separate from it (paragraphs 4-5 of the paper).

5. The pros and cons of a confidential or a public assurance are very finely balanced. The former would be less effective in allaying the fears of the public servants and might leak but it would be immediately less likely to damage relations with China than a public statement. The latter would be authoritative and in the long run probably no more embarrassing (because we could not deny a private undertaking if we were challenged). Particularly if the assurance were in general terms (ie for all Dependent Territories) it might be possible to explain it to the Chinese as a normal guarantee to our employees and not as judgement on their attitude to Hong Kong. Moreover, the petition to the Secretary of State by senior local civil servants will probably become known in Hong Kong and some statement about a reply may well be necessary.

SECRET

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