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otally unacceptable, and it was inconceivable that the Somali
service should go. He accepted that the FCO had done their best
on the BBC's behalf, but their argument was with the Government
as a whole.
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6. Mr Ridley said that it was for the FCO, with its: greater
knowledge of international affairs, to prescribe the hours and
areas for external broadcasting. It was more important that the
BBC should be heard than that it should broadcast everywhere.
It was irresponsible to go on as at present, financing current
operations:.out of capital. Mr Muggeridge acknowledged the FCO's
right to prescribe services, but he could not help looking at the
history of cuts in services and their reinstatement. The capital
position had been a scandal for the past 20 years.
7. Mr Ridley pointed out that the BBC had fought all proposals
for cuts in services, and had therefore themselves been the cause
of the delays in the capital programme. But services were
becoming less audible, and we could not go on postponing the
capital programme. It was the Cabinet's decision that the
capital programme must now be put into effect.
8.
Mr Muggeridge said that the Hong Kong and Seychelles projects
did not fall in the current PESC period, but the BBC needed
commitment to these as they were vital to audibility.
The rest
of the programme was largely concerned with the replacement of
existing plant. Mr Ridley agreed that many of these replacements
should have been made years ago, But it was the BBC's resistance
to cuts in current expenditure which had delayed them. Now the
Government was being firm about the realisation of the capital
programme. Mr Muggeridge had no faith in the Government's
commitment to the programme. For all the BBC knew, the present
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