TNAG-1069-FCO40-1319-Resettlement-of-Vietnamese-refugees-from-Hong-Kong-in-the-UK-1981 — Page 93

Уза

A

Bano

British Embassy

3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008

Telex Domestic USA 83-2370/89-2384

Telex International 64224(WUI) 248308(RCA)/440015(ITT) Tephus

462-1340

ú

thoughtfu

Axway

14

TCS Sitt Esq

South East Asian Department

FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date

inly

C

23 September 1981

السلة

Dear Clive,

REFUGEE POLICY

Liv.) Nam D

HEAD

see f

1. The refugee policy of the Reagan Administration is still in an early a nd formative stage. I had a recent conversation with a colleague from Saigon days who returned from Kuala Lumpur earlier this year where he had been in charge of the Refugee Office in the US Embassy there. He had originally been nominated for a senior refugee post in the Department of Health and Human Services; this has now fallen through for political reasons but he has been working on some aspects of refugee policy in conjunction with elements in the White House staff. He therefore has the advantage of a detailed knowledge of US refugee policy without, at the moment, any corner to fight.

2.

He agreed with your assessment of the Marshall Green Report and commented that it carried no new insights into the problem. The other protagonists in the development of policy he listed as the Immigration and Naturalisation Services, Congress, and the White House. From his comments it would appear that INS are

a negative rather than positive factor; as far as refugees are concerned they are interested in restrict ge number of refugees entering the US from Indo-China both per se and to avoid creating a precedent which could be used in connection with immigration from the Caribbean and Central America. Congress look at the problem as an area in which cuts should be made and, although the recent visit by a delegation from the House of Representatives gave them new insights into the extent of human misery caused by the out flow from Indo-China, my friend thought Congress could be expected to remain hard nosed and anxious to cut down on any possibility of increasing the "pl" factor. Indeed it seems almost inevitable that the budgetary allocations for the refugees will be reduced (commenting on this aspect my friend noted that there was some justification here because the Vietnamese had clearly learnt how to manipulate the Social Security monetary system and were extracting benefits well over their entitlement.)

3. Lastly the White House appear to remain somewhat aloof. The problem seems to be regarded in fairly academic terms and although, as in other areas, they wish to cut government expenditure, they remain open to argument. However, as with INS, the possibility of creating a precedent with Indo-China which could be applied to Haitian and Cuban refugees weighs considerably with them.

14.