TNAG-1059-FCO40-1309-Guangdong-nuclear-power-station-project-1981 — Page 171

programme.

Nevertheless, everybody had been working hard to try and

push the interests of GEC and Mr Stones was of the opinion that the

request from Chên Gang for an invitation to visit the UK would wa>)

e most significant. It was also necessary to take into account

the known preference of CLP for GEC equipment, the importance of the

UK connection and the probable wish of the Chinese to give some

sort of "face" to CLP for all the work they had put in on the

feasibility report. Consequently, Mr Stones was reasonably optimis--

tic of GEC's ultimate success. He added that if the French were

so sure of their own ability to promote an all-French package,

courting

then Framatome would not be painting GEC, CLP and GPC so

assiduously.

The discussion then turned to future activities. Mr Stones

said that he had the impression that Peking was proposing more

technical studies. US consultants such as Bechtel, Gibbs and

Hill, and Quandrex were all noting the work needed to prepare a

call for competitive bids, something CLP and GPC also recognised.

However, a paper Mr Stones had prepared for the Management Committee

suggested that a US firm prepare a functional specification

for the three PWR suppliers and recommended a negotiated contract

strategy based on two separate islands. Mr Stoner considered that

there were a number of factors in favour of a negotiated route.

The effort needed to prepare specifications and evaluate responses

was both expensive and time consuming and one or two years could be

saved by a negotiated contract. Of particular significance in

Chinese eyes would be the fact that CLP had already negotiated

two successful major contracts with the UK for Castle Peak and the

method was therefore well proven.

Mr Stones said that any financial arrangements offered would have

to be good to match the French. The UK would also need to give ur-