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9
DSR 11C
F)
effect. But lacks long-term credibility unless coupled
with arrangements for administration after 1997.
sufficient to halt slide of confidence.
Not
Unilateral action by HMG to remove the limit in the 1898
Order in Council on powers of administration in the New
Territories; Chinese acquiescence.
(i)
Likelihood. Part of the rejected 1979 proposals.
They
Chinese acquiescence would need to be obvious.
are not likely to acquiesce if (as seems possible) they
think that any such change should be coupled with
concessions on sovereignty.
solution similar to (C).
(ii)
Would therefore lead to
Problems for HMG.
As in (C) (ii) above.
(iii) Effect. As in (C) (iii) above.
Conclusion
11.
Stronger verbal assurances from the Chinese (option A)
would not by themselves have a significant effect on
confidence in Hong Kong; and neither would a statement
that 1997 had no relevance (B), unless it opened the way
to action by HMG on the continuation of administrative
powers. Measures to solve the land lease problem with
Chinese consent (E), would be only of short-term effect.
Option (D), providing a period of warning before any change were made in the status of Hong Kong, is marginally
the most attractice from the UK point of view. A public
agreement that the treaties on Hong Kong were not
applicable but that British administration could continue
(C) would also be satisfactory.
removal, with Chinese agreement, of
beyond 1997
possibility is (F)
A third
the limit in the 1898 Order in Council to our administration
in the New Territories beyond 1997. These three would
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