DSR 11C
3.
SECRET
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This leads me to mention the problem we are now
increasingly having to face, namely policy and tactics over
Hong Kong, and how this may affect the planning and handling
of your visit to China.
4.
When I was in Hong Kong, I was very struck by the degree
to which the problem of the future has become a matter of
public debate. It would be wrong to suggest that there is
any panic. Indeed, the economy and confidence generally are
remarkably buoyant.
But they are also brittle and dependent
to a great extent on an expectation that there will be some
kind of new arrangement between Britain and China over
Hong Kong before too long.
5. This means that when you go to China there will be very
high expectations that a solution to the Hong Kong problem
will result, or at the least that some tangible progress
will be evident, for example an agreement to enter
negotiations. In practice, I suspect that it will be rather
difficult to get anything at all clear cut. It is not that
the Chinese want to alter the present position. On the
contrary they are content with it and indeed derive enormous
economic benefit from it. But they are very reluctant to
enter into any formal agreement with us which might appear
to compromise their claim to Hong Kong.
6. There is therefore something of a risk that if, when you
go to China, the leaders there merely repeat their previous
generalised assurances, public and commercial opinion in
Hong Kong could be disillusioned and confidence might be
affected. We need to guard against this and to ensure that
the people in Hong Kong have a reasonable assurance
that British administration will continue.
SECRET
17.
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