DSR 11C
A
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the best prospect would be some form of advance notice
(say 15 years) of any change in the Territory's status
(Option D) or statements by both sides that Hong Kong is
Chinese territory temporarily under British administration with no intention by the Chinese] to change this for many
years to come. The latter would require a change in the
treaty status of the Territory and thus a technical
renunciation of sovereignty by HMG. The Chinese might expect
a similar price for the first arrangement as well.
Prime Minister's visit, 1982
2
10. While we should be prepared to act quickly to discuss
the contingency options with the Chinese Government if a
slide in confidence should occur, this is in fact unlikely
to happen within the next year or so. The Prime Minister
has agreed in principle to visit China and although dates
still have to be agreed, she has provisionally earmarked
September 1982 for this purpose. If she does go to China
then expectations that she will produce a solution to the
Hong Kong problem will be aroused. There is a considerable
risk that the Chinese would not be prepared to add to their
earlier general reassurances. This could bring
disillusionment in Hong Kong and in itself affect confidence. 11. The Prime Minister needs to be warned of this, but We
should also try to prepare the Chinese in order to produce
at least something more concrete than Deng Xiaoping's advice
to investors to 'put their hearts at ease' The Governor of
Hong Kong and the Ambassador in Peking put different
emphasis on such advance planning.
•
The former is concerned
not to rush matters or to irritate the Chinese. The latter
believes that inaction would mean that the Chinese were
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