TNAG-1040-FCO40-1290-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 69

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(B) THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO VISIT

CHINA. THIS MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN SEPTEMBER 1982.

IT

WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID MENTIONING THE HONG KONG

PROBLEM. THE VISIT WOULD RAISE EXPECTATIONS THAT A

SOLUTION WOULD BE FOUND.

3.

AMONG THE OPTIONS SET OUT IN THE PAPER THE MOST

LIKELY TO PROVE EFFECTIVE ARE (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) EITHER:

(A) A DECLARATION BY THE CHINESE THAT THEY WOULD GIVE LONG-

TERM NOTICE (SAY 15 YEARS) OF ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS

OF THE TERRITORY: OR

(3) STATEMENTS BY HMG AND THE CHINESE THAT HONG KONG IS

CHINESE TERRITORY TEMPORARILY UNDER BRITISH ADMINIS-

TRATION AND THAT THE CHINESE HAVE NO INTENTION TO

CHANGE THIS FOR MANY YEARS TO COME.

THE CHINESE PRICE FOR OPTION (A) WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE

RENUNCIATION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY HMG. OPTION (B) ALSO AMOUNTS

TO TECHNICAL RENUNCIATION OF SOVEREIGNTY. HOWEVER AN AD-

JUSTMENT TO THE STATUS OF THE NEW TERRITORIES WILL IN ANY

EVENT BE NECESSARY IN 1997 AND THE REST OF THE TERRITORY

WOULD NOT BE VIABLE ON ITS OWN. OUR AIM IN BEING PREPARED TO

RENOUNCE SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE 1997 WOULD BE TO END UP WITH AN

ASSURANCE OF THE CONTINUATION OF A SEPARATE HONG KONG UNDER

18. BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, WHILE REMOVING THE RISK THAT A 15. CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE MIGHT FORCE US OUT AT SHORT NOTICE.

ANY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY WOULD REQUIRE AN ACT OF PARLIA-

MENT. WE WOULD NEED TO ENSURE THAT ANY ARRANGEMENT

PRESERVED THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HONG KONG'S SEPARATE

EXISTENCE INCLUDING PROVISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP WHICH

REASSURED THE POPULATION.

4.

CLEARLY WE SHOULD NOT MAKE A PREMATURE OFFER TO THE

CHINESE ON SOVEREIGNTY. BUT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO

DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY WHEN THEY ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE.

THIS POINT MAY NOT BE REACHED BY THE TIME OF THE PRIME

MINISTER'S VISIT TO CHINA. BUT SHE SHOULD HAVE THE FULLEST

LATITUDE IN DISCUSSION.

5.

IN ANY CASE WE SHALL NEED TO GIVE THE CHINESE ADVANCE

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