TNAG-1040-FCO40-1290-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 61

SECRET

9

-

DSR 11C

F)

effect. But lacks

Tacks long-term credibility unless coupled

with arrangements for administration after 1997. NOL

sufficient to halt slide of confidence.

Unilatera

al action by HMG to remove the limit in the 1898

Order in Council on powers of administration in the New

Territories; Chinese acquiescence,

(i)

Likelihood. Part of the rejected 1979 proposals.

Chinese acquiescence would need to be obvious. They

are not likely to acquiesce if (as seems possible) they

think that any such change should be coupled with

concessions on sovereignty.

solution similar to (C):

(ii)

Would therefore lead to

Problems for HMG . As in (C) (ii) above.

(iii) Effect. As in (C) (iii) above.

Conclusion

11.

Stronger verbal assurances from the Chinese (option A)

would not by themselves have a significant effect on

confidence in Hong Kong; and neither would a statement

that 1997 had no relevance (B), unless it opened the way

to action by HMG on the continuation of administrative

powers. Measures to solve the land lease problem with

Chinese consent (E), would be only of short-term effect.

Option (D), providing a period of warning before any

change were made in the status of Hong Kong, is marginally

the most attractice from the UK point of view. A public

agreement that the treaties on Hong Kong were not

applicable but that British administration could continue

for the present (C) would also be satisfactory.

possibility is (F) removal, with Chinese agreement, of

A third

the limit in the 1898 Order in Council to our administration

in the New Territories beyond 1997. These three would

SECRET

/almost