TNAG-1040-FCO40-1290-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 162

D

n

CRET

The Rushford

My

guess

in that 7(c) would

Lave much the best chance of getting past? the Chinese. But the point is, of one for policy Jindgment.

Mr Williamson, HKGD

FUTURE OF HONG KONG

cc Mr Friar, HKGD

Mr Freeland

Sir I Sinclair (o.r.)

216

Offreeland) Fl. copy this page

157x

ONLY to

M

Williamson

& the other recipients.

I have recently been giving some further thought to the

*

A.RR.

20.10.

difficulties created by the fact that the New Territories were granted on lease is reflected in the 1898 Order, which does not at present provide a sufficient basis in municipal law for British administration of the New Territories after 30 June

See 1997.

2. There seems to be little likelihood at present that the

Chinese Government would be willing to enter into an agreement

with the UK under which the UK would be authorized to administer

the New Territories after 30 June 1997.

3.

If this situation continues (as well it may) then grave

uncertainties about the continuance of UK administration after

30 June 1997 are bound to develop as that date approaches,

with serious political and economic consequences for Hong Kong

and the UK,

4. As I see it, therefore, HMG may well have to contemplate

taking unilateral action to alter the situation in the hope

that such action will receive the tacit acquiescence of the

Chinese and not provoke them into retaliation.

5.

On the UK side it seems to be axiomatic that the territory

of Hong Kong can be satisfactorily administered only as a whole

in other words, if the New Territories were surrendered, the

rest of the colony would be untenable.

Ж.

*. I meant to

say

t{

'created by

reason

SECRET

of the fact

/ 6.

"1

.