TNAG-1040-FCO40-1290-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 138

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NOTE

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: TACTICS

Reference...

HKK 040/1

213

The Pace

1.

(a) The Governor, in paragraph 6 of his draft, lays stress on

the point that we should not nag the Chinese over confidence; until a slide comes or they become more receptive, we should merely make sure their eyes are open to problems as they arise.

(b) The Ambassador wishes for a more robust policy of

persuasion to give the Chinese an early sight of the options, as once a crisis is reached they may be incapable of moving with the required alacrity. He does not however rate the chances of success in this very highly.

The Prime Minister's visit

2.

(a) Assuming there is no visible slump in confidence before

the Prime Minister's visit, the Governor (his paragraph 8) prefers to leave open the question of whether she should be encouraged to begin a dialogue on the future, and, if she is to do so, writes of giving the Chinese at least two months' notice of it.

(b) The Ambassador feels that the Prime Minister's visit is an

opportunity to raise the contingencies question that cannot be missed if the Chinese are to take us seriously in future. Furthermore, he believes two months to be much too short: the LPS should give notice of the Prime Minsiter's intentions in January.

Intermediaries

3.

(a) The Governor feels that Hong Kong Chinese businessmen,

carefully chosen and primed, could be used as inter- mediaries (his paragraphs 6 and 8) because of their high connections in Peking to drop controlled hints to the Chinese as a preliminary to talks.

(b) The Ambassador accepts that intermediaries have a role

to play in reflecting feelings of uncertainty among Hong Kong business interests, but they will do this anyway and it should be allowed to take its course.

If we are seen

or believed to be pulling strings, it might give weight to the view that we have somehow manufactured the problem.

Special Emissary

4.

(a) In his paragraph 7, the Governor suggests that an emissary

might be used to lead talks in the event of a slide.

(b) The Ambassador, while not dismissing this option, comments

that the talks could be protracted and the presence of an emissary could not be kept secret.

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