TNAG-1039-FCO40-1289-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 29

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DSR 11C

visit, but we would probably not have that much latitude.

Moreover a ministerial visit might attract too much

publicity and itself shake confidence. Depending on

circumstances, therefore, the best tactic might be a personal

message delivered either in Peking or in London.

12.

The content of the message would also have to be

decided at the time but it should probably not be detailed.

It should certainly not offer a definitive solution which

the Chinese might feel compelled to shoot down. The best

formula might be to draw attention to the problem and its

urgency and to invite the Chinese to discuss as quickly as

possible ways of supporting confidence in Hong Kong. We

would need to keep any subsequent discussions as simple as

possible. It would be very difficult to obtain Chinese

agreement to any complex formula in time to halt a slide in

confidence.

13. Both in monitoring Hong Kong and Chinese opinion, and

even, in certain circumstances, in discussing solution, the

option of using non-official intermediaries with Peking

needs to be borne in mind. There are a number of potential

'messengers' mainly senior Hong Kong Chinese businessmen with

close contacts in Peking, who might be used. But in so

delicate a matter the question of control is very important.

A message loosely delivered could give a totally false

impression and defeat its own object. Probably, therefore,

such intermediaries should only be used, and that very

sparingly, as one means of keeping our lines open to Peking

and estimating the direction of movement of thinking there.

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