TNAG-1038-FCO40-1288-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 76

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DSR 11C

executive functions.

Would mean formalisation of

NCNA First Director's role. No serious problem for

us but Chinese would be unlikely to give concrete

guarantees in return.

e) Chinese participation in administration.

This could

range from a simple right of consultation by the

Chinese Representative through membership of EXCO/LEGCO

to some say in the appointment of the Governor. The

former might be workable but any type of joint

administration or Chinese government by proxy would

create intolerable problems for HMG and would itself

damage confidence in Hong Kong.

Conclusions

5.

a) Substance of agreement. Our first aim should be an

agreement on a sufficient period of notice [say at

least 15 years] for the termination of British

Administration.

In return we should try to limit

ourselves to an acknowledgement of the Chinese

position on sovereignty but

be prepared to

recognise residual or even

actual Chinese sovereingty

in return for progressively stronger guarantees.

Any agreement must involve Chinese acquiesence in

whatever measures were necessary to preserve the legal

basis for British Administration. Could agree to

Chinese Representative with minimal rights of

consultation but not to joint administration.

b) Form of Agremeent.

Formal Treaty unlikely.

Confidential understanding with associated public

statements or actions more probable.

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