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with Ke Hua on 5 April. If they do not volunteer anything I do not think it would be inappropriate to ask Song, or Ke, whether they have any comment. If we can keep this, or another channel, open at best it could point the way to a solution; at the least it could improve Chinese, and British, understanding of the problem and ensure that they are given as much notice as possible of a deteriorating situation in Hong Kong. This does not mean running after them; but
it does mean giving them every opportunity to pursue a dialogue if they wish to.
10. Second, we shall need to prepare on a contingency basis the kind of package that might meet Chinese requirements and our own and allow them to take the action needed in a crisis. The ideal package might be a recognition of Chinese sovereignty on our part, agreement that 1997 had no special significance and a Chinese assurance that we should be given good notice, say 10 - 15 years, of a Chinese intention to resume control. But in any package the key element will have to be a concession on sovereignty on our part. This will mean reference to Ministers on our side well in advance to allow us to negotiate fast when a slide begins and perhaps even to give some indication of this possible concession in advance of any slide.
11. I have not considered here detailed modalities, eg messages from Ministers to the Chinese. Such messages may be needed if the Hong Kong situation deteriorates, but I would not recommend them now. Nor have I considered the question of Mrs Thatcher's visit in 1982, which will again bring the Hong Kong question into prominence. The immediate steps I feel are to reach an agreed interpretation of Deng's remarks and to make the necessary recommendation to Ministers to allow us some freedom of action in talking to the Chinese.
12. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Murray MacLehose.
Yeuroneer
ENC
PERCY CRADOCK
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