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internal criticism by opponents. So far these considerations
have prevented them from giving more than general assurances
and they have emphasised the difference between the economic
and political aspects. On the other side is their undoubted
interest in maintaining stability and economic prosperity in
Hong Kong but it will require very strong evidence of a slide
in confidence for them to consider meeting our requirements,
In any event they are likely to make counter conditions over
the following range:
a) Formal rendition, ie British recognition of existing
Chinese sovereignty over the whole Hong Kong Territory.
No legal obstacle to this. Could be done by new Treaty
(unlikely to appeal to Chinese for historical reasons)
or in accordance with less formal arrangements,
provided that these gave a sound basis for continued
British Administration.
ment would be necessary.
Either way an Act of Parlia-
Strong indication that
Chinese might take this line from Deng Xiaoping's
conversation with Lord Carrington in April 1981.
Would be major political concession by HMG. Should
only be traded for strongest possible Chinese
assurances.
J
b) UK acknowledgement' (ie taking note) of Chinese
statements on sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Similar to
Taiwan formula. Chinese might accept but unlikely
to give very concrete guarantees in return.
c) A variant would be British acknowledgement that
sovereignty would 'revert', ie would be given up,
the period of British Administration ended.
when
d) Chinese Official Representative in Hong Kong without
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