A
you. Sen
السلسة
P.26.
NB nd mut
Yes
PARAGRAPH 15
SECRET
THE LAST SENTENCE IS AN ILLUSTRATION RATHER THAN A SINE QUA
NON.
OTHER CHINESE ACTIONS COULD HAVE THE SAME PRACTICAL AND
SYMBOLIC EFFECT.
PARAGRAPHS 21-22
THE PROBLEMS FOR US OF REMAINING IN HONG KONG COULD BE SET
OUT WITH MORE CLARITY UNDER THE FOLLOWING FOUR HEADS: (A) ADMINISTRATION OF HONG KONG
(B) HONG KONG /UNITED KINGDOM FRICTIONS
(C) UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION
(D) INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS (FRICTION WITH CHINA, DEFENCE OBLIGATIONS, INTERNATIONAL OPINION ETC).
PARAGRAPH 26
THERE
THE REFERENCE TO THE EARLY 1990S IS PERHAPS MISLEADING.
ARE TOO MANY VARIABLES AFFECTING MANIPULATION OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE **SMALL QUESTION AND THE ''BIG
QUESTION''. UNLESS THE MEDIUM TERM DISPOSITIONS ARE WATER- TIGHT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT COULD SURELY FIND IT NECESSARY, FOR REASONS OF CONFIDENCE, TO SORT OUT THEIR THOUGHTS ON THE LONG TERM AT AN EARLIER DATE. MOREOVER THEIR INTERNAL
CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM SHOULD ALREADY HAVE ACQUIRED A
CERTAIN MOMENTUM.
PARAGRAPH 28
SUB-P AR AGRPAH (A)
I AGREE WITH THE GOVERNOR'S COMMENT. STRIKE ME AS UNDERSTATING THE VERY STRONG MORAL AND POLITICAL PRESSURES TO WHICH WE SHOULD BE SUBJECTED BY THE INHABITANTS OF THE COLONY AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF NEIGHBOURING TERRITORIES
IN WHICH THEY MIGHT TAKE REFUGE.
ANNEX C
?
Greciate
لحسبه
At leases wall
사
dim to bened
I AGREE WITH THE GOVERNOR THAT OPTION (B) ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY HARD TO ATTAIN, IS CONSIDERABLY MORE ATTRACTIVE THAN THE PAPER MAKES IT SOUND. IN PRACTICE OPTION (C) WOULD SCARECELY BE
THE CHINESE WOULD FACE CRITICISM ON THE SAME GROUNDS AS IN OPTION (B) BUT WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO
EASIER THAN B).
DEFEND THEMSELVES PUBLICLY. IT WOULD MOREOVER BE DIFFIUCLT TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE COLONY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
CLEAR CHINESE STATEMENT OF INTENT.
CRADOCK
TLD
HD| WKYGD HD/FED
SIRE YOUDE
MR DONALD
2 SECRET
? varriten os (e) i
5 titte & Yaid.
う
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