TNAG-1037-FCO40-1287-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 62

DRAFT

SECRET

HONG KONG

OPTIONS FOR A LONG-TERM SOLUTION

ANNEX A

a) Chinese Take-Over by Force or Threat of Force Before or

After 1997

Prospects:

Remote. Even a return to radical Government in Peking

would not necessarily result in take-over (cf 1967).

Implications for HMG: Not resistible. Would appear as major political defeat. Probably our only option to attempt to negotiate

transition period (which would lead to major immigration pressure

on the United Kingdom).

b)Continuance of Status Quo beyond 1997 by formal agreement with

Chinese

Prospects: Very doubtful. Would involve Chinese public endorsement

of continuing colonial rule (difficulties with Third World, Soviet

criticism and as precedent for Taiwan).

Implications for HMG: The best option for HMG since confidence would

be reinforced (though this would depend on terms, if any, of the

agreement). Possible international and domestic criticism of

maintenance of colonial rule.

c) Continuance of Status Quo beyond 1997 with

Chinese acquiesence

Prospects: Doubtful. Chinese could take line that 1997 is British

problem but may still face international and domestic criticism.

Peking might still object to any UK legal device as basis for

continuing administration of New Territories.

Implications for HMG: May not be sufficient to maintain confidence,

but will depend on context.

would continue uncertainty.

Indefinite duration of administration

/d)

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