TNAG-1037-FCO40-1287-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 118

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DSR 11C

1

move towards an agreement with China. Damage to confidence

would depend on the context in which the move was set,

whether significant concessions had been made by the Chinese

in return and what the Chinese said about it. If the matter

came up during the next 5 years, this would probably mean

in practice moves on our part to reassure investors

particular to overcome the difficulty over individual land

leases. We would need to use a concession over a Chinese

representative to obtain as concrete undertakings as

Į

possible from the Chinese on these points. These should

go beyond the general assurances which Chinese leaders have

given so far. We would need at least an arrangement whereby

Peking agreed that the Hong Kong Government would in future

issue standard leases of a definite duration, say 25 years,

and that Peking recognised their validity. In this case

we would still need to overcome the problem of whether

such leases were valid under British law.

Chinese Participation in Hong Kong Administration

21. The range of possible demands is given in paragraph

12(c) above. The more extreme proposals, such as membership

of the Executive and/or Legislative Councils, are very

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/unlikely