TNAG-1036-FCO40-1286-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 88

a)

b)

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DSR 11C

a British acknowledgement of ultimate Chinese

sovereignty;

agreement to the appointment of a Chinese Government

Representative in Hong Kong;

c)

a degree of Chinese Government participation in the

administration of Hong Kong.

4.

(a) would raise legal and political difficulties. The

former would be soluble but the risk of damaging confidence in

Hong Kong would be so great that we could only make a state-

ment on Chinese sovereignty in return for a specific under-

taking on continuing British administration.

would be unlikely to agree.

The Chinese

5. (b) is legally feasible. The functions of the represent-

ative would be important. If he were a liaison official with

quasi-diplomatic functions, his appointment would not raise

too many problems. But we should still not make a concession

on this point without getting in return as specific an under-

taking as possible from the Chinese on land leases.

6.

(c) would raise serious problems, whether Chinese

participation were channelled through their representative in

Hong Kong or in another form. It would lead to disagreements

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Dd 0532000 400 M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell

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