2
a.
SECRET
11. SINCE THE CHINESE MAY WELL TAKE A LIGHTER VIEW THAN US OF THE DANGERS OF ALLOWING HONG KONG TO DEFLATE THROUGH GROWING SENSE OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY, WE SHOULD ALSO BE READY WITH PROPOSALS THAT
IF NECESSARY WOULD JOLT THE CHINESE INTO TAKING SERIOUSLY OUR INSISTENCE THAT SOMETHING MUST BE DONE.
12. I WOULD SEE THE EMBASSY TAKING THE LEADING ROLE IN DEGREE 2, AND I SEE MERIT IN THEM PLAYING A PART IN DEGREE 1, BUT SEE NO MERIT IN THEM SEEKING FORMAL OR INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF A DIRECTIVE FROM DENG TO THE MFA, I.E. A DEGREE 2 SITUATION. THIS IS BECAUSE WITHOUT SUCH A DIRECTIVE I DO NOT BELIEVE THE TALKS WOULD GET ANYWHERE OR EVEN HAVE AN EDUCATIVE EFFECT. I DOUBT THE INFLUENCE OF THE MFA IN SUCH AN ISSUE, EVEN IF IT WERE PREPARED TO USE IT, AND I FEAR THAT THE REITERATION OF PRESENT POSITIONS IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS MIGHT ONLY COMPLICATE THE PROCESS OF A REAL NEGOTIATION ONCE IT HAS EVENTUALLY BEEN STARTED BY AN AUTHORITATIVE DIRECTIVE.
13. WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPHS 4-6 OF CRADOCK'S LETTER OF 18 DECEMBER, NEGOTIATION OF ANYTHING WITH THE CHINESE IS A SLOW BUSINESS, BUT IN THIS CASE I DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS TIME THAT IS NEEDED SO MUCH AS POLITICAL WILL DEMONSTRATED BY A DIRECTIVE FROM DENG. GRANTED THE LATTER A NEGOTIATION COULD PROGRESS QUITE QUICKLY (AT ANY RATE TO A POINT AT WHICH IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ACT TO ARREST A SLIDE IN CONFIDENCE), WHILE WITHOUT IT MERE TIME WOULD BE OF LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE.
14. I AGREE THAT DEGREE 2 COULD BEST BE INITIATED AT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING (PARAGRAPH 6 OF CRADOCK'S LETTER), BUT THE PRIME CONSIDERATIONS ARE THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG AND THE STATE OF CHINESE RECEPTIVITY. IF ONE OR OTHER OF THESE WARRANT WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO GET THINGS STARTED BY A MINISTER TO MINISTER MESSAGE: IF THEY DO NOT THERE IS NO POINT IN PUSHING BEYOND A CERTAIN POINT EVEN AT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING.
MACLEHOSE
LIMITED
HD/HK&GD
HD/FED
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE MR DONALD
- 3- SECRET
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