TNAG-1036-FCO40-1286-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 113

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our relations with Peking. But these difficulties would be

relatively short-lived and would be unlikely on their own to

deter a British Government from leaving.

22.

Problems directly related to Hong Kong itself would be

much more serious:

a) Our obligations to the population. British Ministers

of successive governments have stressed their readi-

ness to support Hong Kong and, by implication, to

provide a refuge for a substantial group which had

chosen not to live under Communism.

Withdrawal would

be seen in Hong Kong and outside as a betrayal and as

inconsistent with the line taken on the Falkland

Islands and Gibraltar.

b) The consequence of (a) would be demands for entry to

the United Kingdom by a substantial proportion of the

Hong Kong Citizens of the United Kingdom and

Colonies (at present estimated at 2.6 million) and

1

probably by a number of other Hong Kong residents

who would claim a moral commitment to them by HMG.

c) There would be an immediate collapse of business

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/confidence

Dd 0532000 400 M 5/78 HMSO Bracknell