TNAG-1029-FCO40-1279-Visits-by-FCO-officials-to-Hong-Kong-1981 — Page 52

CONFIDENTIAL

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1

G

F

E

Argument

5.

However, it is clear from what the Governor has said that total

rejection of UMELCO's proposals will aggravate the feeling of mistrust

in Hong Kong and lead to renewed threats of resignation from Unofficials.

On the other hand, there are very good domestic political and policy

arguments why we should make no further concessions to Hong Kong on

nomenclature.

These are set out in NTD's note of 29 April. But it

is my view that we must be guided by the Governor on the strength of

feeling in Hong Kong on this issue, which could precipitate loss of

confidence in the future stability of the territory and all that that

entails, by at least demonstrating to community leaders there that the

FCO is prepared to fight Hong Kong's case so long as it remains a

reasonable one. I see no alternative, therefore, to the Secretary of

State raising the matter with the Home Secretary.

6. There are three possible approaches:

a)

b)

c)

to ask the Home Secretary to agree to amending the Bill, as suggested

by Hong Kong, along with the insertion of a suitable nationality

title in Hong Kong passports;

no amendment to the Bill but a statement in the House assuring CBDTs

that they would continue to be British Nationals (paragraph 8 of

and

Hong Kong Telegram No 443); or

administrative action only whereby CBDT passports show the bearers

as being UK Nationals.

From Hong Kong's point of view, (a) is the most desirable and (c) is

Blue unlikely to be sufficient. (b)//might be acceptable as a fall-back

parisinil,

position and could perhaps be negotiated with the Home Office should

Mr Whitelaw reject (a).

CONFIDENTIAL

17.