TNAG-1004-FCO40-1248-Capital-punishment-in-the-Dependent-Territories-1981 — Page 32

THE FOLLOWING REFERENCE NUMBER

LD BE QUOTED IN ANY REPLY

B/2/1/101

NO..................................................STRERTE

*

*

CARREIRAS

ÇAYMAN ISLANDS

HWC 0.53/1

19 FEB 1981

West Indian & Atlantic Department Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1

R FR Deare Esq

Decame

1.

Run,

нка 38013

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

RECEIVED WRESTLY N

NY

2

GRAND CAYMAN

18 FEB 18

CAYMAN ISLANDS

30 January

ภาษ

Tw. Sollore

M. Mather

81

131..........

to see. HKGD SR.

HKGD skd.see for

xl. I have minted sefinitely

abort the Common Ama petition

Ele

I enclose a copy of the LIC Report for the period 17 December 1980 to 28 January 1981.

2.

It has been another very quiet month and I have few comments on the report. These are as follows:

"3.

Internal Political"

Reg.

14/2

Usual distâts

It see ter Deare's

Despite the apparent agreement of the people of Cayman Brac comment)

to accept, at least for a trial period, the de facto situation following the 1980 elections in which no elected member for the Lesser Islands was elected to Executive Council, the two elected members for the Lesser Islands, led by Captain Charles Kirkconnell, took the opportunity of your visit to Cayman Brac to organise and present a petition requesting constitutional change to make the appointment to Executive Council of a member from the Lesser Islands obligatory in the 1984 elections. No decision has yet been taken how to proceed with this, which is primarily a matter for local resolution before a formal approach to Her Majesty's Government. The difficulties in acceding to the request are:

(a) the general political climate is against any constitutional change, as any one amendment of the Constitution would lead to the examination of others;

(b)

(c)

(a)

the 1980 elections were fought by two embryo political parties known locally as "groups". It would be difficult to follow the principle of collective responsibility in Executive Council (a constitutional requirement) if a member not of the group in power had an automatic right to take his seat in Council;

because the two Cayman Brac Members of the Assembly are not members of the group in power, the proposals are likely to be resisted or rejected politically, thereby leading to a confrontation between the politicians in Cayman Brac and the politicians on Grand Cayman the classic Anguilla Nevis Barbuda situation;

to create a fifth elected seat in Executive Council would bring about a situation where the Executive with eight seats in Executive Council was no longer responsible to the Legislature which would only have seven backbench members in minority. To cure this, additional seats would have to be created in the Assembly and the whole question of representation on a more equitable population basis would be opened up (George Town with half the population of Grand Cayman has three seats; the other constituencies on Grand Cayman have seven in total).

separate envelope

ہم

विर

/"4.

Internal General"

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL