TNAG-0991-FCO40-1210-Policy-on-salaries-and-pensions-for-civil-service-in-Hong-Ko-1980 — Page 286

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of Grenada was "authorized to establish a legislature, and,

with its advice and consent, make laws". By other Letters Patent, given ̈ subsequently, but before the legislature had been brought into being, the King attempted to impose a particular tax upon goods exported from the island. held by the Privy Council that he could not do so for he had

It was

"immediately and irrecoverably granted ...

that the subordinate legislation over the island should be exercised by an assembly with the consent of the governor and council".

Can the Crown likewise dispose of its power by

simple contract? The Attorney Generci says not. Yet there

is room for argument.

In Campbell v. Hall the Crown was

bound by its own Froclamation and Letters Patent. Both are

recognised forms of law making. But so, in principle, is a contract, even though the "laws" made by it apply only to the immediate parties. If one of those partics is the Crown,

should it not also be bound? Frovided of course that the

person making the contract on its behalf has the authority to do so. The Governor of Hong Kong, cey have that authority,

by virtue of Article XIV of the Letters Patent. It is often

said that the Crown cannot fetter its future executive action.

But that has no relevance to suspension; the Crown is protected

by the implied right to dismiss.

If this indeed be the case, it is then argued that by the introduction of disciplinary provisions into the Civil Service Regulations the Crown in Hong Kong has in fact deprived itself of its inherent power to suspend, in the same way that it had in South Australis by assenting to the Public Service

ct, 1916: see Hunkin v. Siebert. Whether this is so or not will depend upon whether or not the regulations have contractual force, a question that remains to be definitively settled. In Choi Sum v. ttorney General I took the view that they did

not. But I did not have the bencfit of any argument to the

contrary, for counsel on both sides urged me to the same end. In the Court of Appeal the Solicitor General put forward the

opposite view. Unfortunately the court did not find it necessary