TNAG-0979-FCO40-1198-Implications-for-Hong-Kong-of-changes-in-British-nationality-1980 — Page 231

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Mr Murray

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED NEW NATIONALITY LAW

1.

AKK 340/1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 51 28 JAN1980

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INDEX

PA

RITR

No

2811

REGISTRY

Action Taken

Awak

We are attending Mr Figgs meeting on 21 January at 3.30 pm to discuss the problem of how the Dependent Territories are to be fitted in under the proposed new British Nationality Law. Although all the Dependent Territories are affected, the problem is essentially a Hong Kong one: we have assumed all along that the other territories will fit in with whatever is decided for Hong Kong. The latest telegrams (working pp) do not basically contradict this.

2. The Home Office's latest views were set out in the draft memorandum which they sent to N&TD in December (a copy was attached to Mr Gray's minute of 21 December 1979). This was a pretty unsatisfactory memorandum in many ways: but before redrafting it, N&TD thought they should seek the views of Dependent Territory Governors on the Home Office's proposals for nomenclature (plus certain variants which they agreed with us). They therefore sent FCO telegram No 1 Personal to Anguilla of 4 January to all Governors.

3. Unlike other Governors who were asked to give strictly personal replies, the Acting Governor of Hong Kong was authorised to consult EXCO. Sir J Cater's reply is in his telegram No 95 of 15 January.

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4. Hong Kong have rejected the various suggestions in our telegram of 4 January. Instead, they are now putting forward as their preferred title (assuming a change to be inevitable) a formula that has previously been rejected by both the Ambassador in Peking and the Governor because of the risk that it would be unacceptable to the Chinese (Peking have now pointed this out in their telegram No 41. Hong Kong are also proposing the use of a term, "British Subject", which the Home Office have flatly rejected in the past.

5. It is unfortunate that Hong Kong have been in some respects inconsistent because it make it more difficult to represent their case to the Home Office. Nevertheless they have been remarkably consistent on one point - the demand for retention of CUKC-and we must not underestimate the strength of feeling on this. It is important to be as precise as possible in forecasting the problems which a decision to go ahead against Hong Kong views would bring. It may be exaggerated to expect that there would be a widespread spontaneous loss of confidence. Left to itself public opinion in Hong Kong might be relatively apathetic. But of course it would not be left to itself. The main problem would come from the Unofficials, who have so far refrained from publicising the issue but who would certainly do so if they felt they had been steamrollered. This, on the one hand, would mean a more uncooperative attitude by the Unofficials on other issues in EXCO and LEGCO, and on the other encouragement of public and press opposition to the move.

*Now endorsed by Mr Cradock (Bangkok telegram No 60)

CONFIDENTIAL

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