TNAG-0972-FCO40-1191-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-1980 — Page 90

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

CONFIDENTIAL

Singapore would not then take them, so the ship owner would have either to throw the refugees into the sea, or bring them to Bermuda. But this was nd the point, which was rather the implica- tions for the future. In the formula we had put forward in February we had tried to say that we would not allow any burden to be imposed on Bermuda which was unreasonable. This was generosity on our part; it meant that if a Bermudian ship picked up 1,000 refugees, and we considered that 50 could reasonably be absorbed in Bermuda, we would be taking into Britain 950 refugees over and above our own quota. We were making a great concession in thus taking the threat away from Bermuda.

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At this stage the Bermudian Ministers asked for an adjournement.

When discussion resumed, Mr Gibbons said that he and his colleagues must take the problem back to his Cabinet. But he had three points to make. First, would Britain be able to help with the basic assimi- lation training needed before these people could feel at home in western society (with expenses met by Bermuda of course). Mr Ridley felt sure the UK could help as proposed. Secondly, Mr Gibbons said that he and his colleagues would have to consider the Register question very carefully; it seemed they would need to wind it down, because its risks outweighed its advantages. Thirdly, he asked if HMG would be prepared to make representations to the UN on behalf of Bermuda, quoting the UNHCR view that Bermuda could not absorb the Port Hawkesbury group, requesting that they should be absorbed into the US quota. Mr Ridley explained that the UN did not have the authority to increase the quotas of different states. To have them included within the US quota would displace other refugees from that quota. Every two refugees that Bermuda shuffled to some other country meant that two less would find homes from Hong Kong. Nevertheless he would look into this point. Mr Gibbons suggested that Sir John Plowman could prepare a memorandum on this subject to give to Mr Ridley before his departure on 20 May.

7 Finally discussion turned again to whether a quota could be established for Bermuda. Mr Ridley read out the formula proposed in February. This could not be rewritten to include a specific number but the key point was that we would not impose on Bermuda an impossible number of refugees. We understood the pressures in Bermudian society,

and would make sure that the burdens were not unreasonable.

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