TNAG-0950-FCO40-1169-Effect-of-nuclear-exports-to-China-on-Hong-Kong-Guangdong-nu-1980 — Page 46

Mr McLaren

FED

HKK166||

·4

CONFIDENTIAL

S N?ར་༥

143

Fie

GUANGDONG NUCLEAR PROJECT

1. When the Governor saw Mr Manzie on 4 November the latter asked for his view on the state of play on the Guangdong Nuclear Project following Sir P Cradock's reported conversation with Vice-Premier Gu Mu.

2. The Governor said that when he had visited Guangzhou the provincial authorities had shown clearly that they expected that substantial sections of the equipment for the project would be British. In his view, it was premature to take too gloomy a view from Gu Mu's remarks. Gu Mu's role, despite his seniority, was not absolutely clear. Obviously the Chinese needed to show President Giscard's visit had had positive results but it would be surprising if they had taken a final decision on the form of the project.

3. The Governor thought it would be sensible to wait until the Executive Committee meeting on the Guangdong project to see whether any statements were made there by the Chinese side on the French role. Of course, if they repeated Gu Mu's remarks that would be a very strong indicator, but they were perhaps unlikely to do so.

4. In the light of the Executive Committee meeting, it would be necessary to consider whether and to what extent use could be made of the Hong Kong card' in leaning on the Chinese. Obviously this would have to be done very

carefully.

Бир

5 November 1980

R D Clift

Hong Kong and General Department

сс

Mr Manzie (DOI)

Mr Alston (JNU)

Mr Morrice

Mr March (BTC, Hong Kong)

CONFIDENTIAL