TNAG-0950-FCO40-1169-Effect-of-nuclear-exports-to-China-on-Hong-Kong-Guangdong-nu-1980 — Page 172

(a)

unless their governments were similarly prepared to accept some residual third party liability:

the liability of the UK under a suitably drafted agreement would exist only as long as Hong Kong and the New Territories remained the responsibility of 'the

UK and outside the control of the PRC.

Moreover,

13. If it is decided that liability should be shared, the main principles would need to be expressed in some form of agreement between the UK and the PRC. In theory this might be achieved by inducing the PRC to accede to the relevant conventions, modifying their application between the PRC and Hong Kong by bilaterial

agreement. This would be somewhat cumbersome however. the PRC might not wish to accede; nor might existing members wish to accept PRC's accession. It would appear to be simpler to incorporate the main elements of the conventions, modified as described above, into a self-contained bilateral agreement. In

any case, even if neither HMG nor HKG were to accept any liability, such an agreement would be likely to be necessary to establish Hong Kong rights to compensation from the PRC.

Replacement of Lost Nuclear Power

14. In the event of a serious accident the Hong Kong Government might expect that the UK should meet liability for the cost of providing alternative power supplies to Hong Kong. It could be argued, however, that since the PRC does not at present supply Hong Kong with any power, the only cost which should be considered is that which might arise from the difference between operating a coal or oil fired power station compared with the nuclear station. As there is no legal commitment to supply power, the question of any liability would be a commercial one for settlement between the

operating company and the Hong Kong Electricity Supply Company.

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