TNAG-0950-FCO40-1169-Effect-of-nuclear-exports-to-China-on-Hong-Kong-Guangdong-nu-1980 — Page 117

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4.

(a) HMG would meet the cost of technical direction of the cleaning up operation (this would in any event provide the UK with valuable experience);

(b)

the company operating the station should have strict liability in respect of third party damage up to an agreed limit;

(c) the PRC government should accept all residual liability for damage within the PRC: responsibility for Hong Kong should rest with the Hong Kong/UK governments. (The latter would require legislation.)"

On non-proliferation I suggest an additional paragraph for your paper as follows:

5.

"Ministers have agreed the following approach:

(a)

No requirement for IAEA safeguards (since the PRC is a Nuclear Weapon State);

(b) But we should seek assurances of physical protection,

no diversion from peaceful use, and no retransfer without agreement.

Non-proliferation conditions may prove to be a key factor in establishing Chinese preference between the US and France. The French have obtained President Carter's approval to their supplying on similar conditions a French built PWR based on a Westinghouse design. But the US position on direct supply to the PRC would be different. It seems likely that even if IAEA safeguards were not required bilateral US safeguards would be.

TE

I am copying this letter to Barbara Parkin at the Department of Energy, and Hugh Davies in FED, here.

yours

ever,

Пак

M G Roberts

Joint Nuclear Unit

CONFIDENTIAL