TNAG-0949-FCO40-1168-Effect-of-nuclear-exports-to-China-on-Hong-Kong-Guangdong-nu-1980 — Page 51

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CONFIDENTIAL

R J Alston Esq

Joint Nuclear Unit.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

*

Dear Robert,

Endin

BRITISH EMBASSY

3100 Massachusetts Ave. u.. N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008 Telephone: (202) 452-1340

24 July 1980

HKKIGG!

29/

14 AUG 1980

zon Takda

INDER

мо

no 1 76.8

7(A)

US/CHINA: CIVIL NUCLEAR COLLABORATION

1. You mentioned to me in London your interest in US attitudes to the Guangdong project; and since returning from leave I have seen your circular letter of 12 May and a number of responses from other posts. I should record the latest US view, which may slightly differ from your earlier understanding.

2.

At lunch Michael Guhin (Director of the State Department Office of Nuclear Export Policy) talked about safeguards for China. While.. the US legislation was not entirely clear on all the issues there was general acceptance within the Administration of the following:

(a) if US companies reached an agreement with the Chinese

to supply materials or technology, the US would have to seek safeguards on these;

3.

흐흐

(b) they would start by trying to secure IAEA safeguards;

there was no question of requiring full scope safeguards from the Chinese.

(c)

(a)

(e)

a "peaceful use" commitment would also be needed, together with satisfaction on physical security.

there was no legal requirement under the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 for the US to obtain IAEA safeguards. Indeed there were some people in the Administration who claimed that there was no legal requirement under the Act for the US to obtain any safe- guards at all from the Chinese; and that the only legal demand was that safeguards which had been obtained should be of indefinite duration.

This of course puts a slightly different complexion on the possibilities of US/China collaboration, compared with the position outlined in paragraph 5 of your letter under reference. Looking again at the Act, I believe that what Guhin was referring to was Section 305, which by the NPT reference excludes the need for IAEA safeguards applied to a NWS; and to Section 401 of which Sub-Section

CONFIDENTIAL

/A(1)