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DSR 11C
7. Another possibility would be to issue leases to run
beyond 1997 and only introduce legislation by Order in
Council if their validity should be challenged in court.
This would then need careful explaining to the Chinese.
Alternatively, should they be warned in advance of what we
were doing?
8. If the idea of issuing leases beyond 1997 is not feasible
(for our own legal reasons or because of likely Chinese
objections), can we improve on the existing Chinese
assurances? One possibility would be a statement by the
Chinese that, as far as they were concerned, the holders of
leases issued by the "present authorities in Hong Kong" would
be able to continue to enjoy the use of land after 1997
whatever the eventual political arrangements. In the absence
of this, would Chinese private assurances to individual
investors be helpful?
9. How should we react to any Chinese request for a politi-
cal price in return for their help over leases? Possibilities
are:
(a) Chinese official representation in Hong Kong;
(b) Some kind of British recognition (public or confidential)
of ultimate Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Any concession on our part on (a) or (b) should only be made
if we got a cast-iron undertaking on continuing British
administration.
We would then be into the renegotiation of
our whole position in Hong Kong.
10. How significant is the China Resources project at Tin
Shui Wai in the New Territories? Any further indications of
official Chinese attitude?
11. Significance of other major projects on both sides of the border (e.g. Guangdong nuclear project, new airport).
airport is at Lantao, how difficult will it be to raise
If the
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/finance
S4200(22454) DD.0532198 300M 7/79 GWB LTD.GP.870
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