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B. WE COULD CLOSE THE FRONTIER AS PROPOSED BY PARA 6(3) OF
PEKING'S TUR. I THINK THIS FAR TOO DRASTIC AS A FIRST STEP. THE
CHINESE WOULD RIGHTLY CONSIDER WE WERE OVER-REACTING. THE HUMAN TRAFFIC IN EACH DIRECTION A DAY IS SEVERAL THOUSAND (ABOUT 5,000), IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONTROL THIS WITHOUT CLOSING THE BRIDGE
TO RAIL TRAFFIC AS WELL, THUS INFLATING FOOD PRICES AND BREAKING
OUR AGREEMENT ON THE THROUGH-TRAIN,
6, 1 AIRED THESE PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES IN EXCO YESTERDAY.
MEMBERS WERE QUALLY DISTURBED BY THE IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION
CONTINUING AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL, AND BY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ACTION PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPHS 3, 4 AND 5 ABOVE.
AND THE OUTCOME WAS INCONCLUSIVE. I ASKED THEM TO REFLECT AND
WILL RAISE AGAIN NEXT TUESDAY, I HOPE IN THE LIGHT OF A LINE
AGREED WITH YOU AND PEKING.
7. 1 NATURALLY WANT TO AVOID THE TENSION AND LOSS OF GOODWILL THAT DIRECT ACTION AS IN PARA 5 WOULD INVOLVE. BUT THE PRESENT
SITUATION CANNOT BE ACCEPTED INDEFINITELY. IF THE AMBASSADOR
BELIEVES WE CAN DIRECT THE ATTENTION OF THE CHINESE TO THE
PROBLEM OF ILLEGALS AS WELL AS LEGALS WITHOUT DIRECTION ACTION
(IE SIMPLY BY TALKING TO THEM) IT IS WORTH A FURTHER TRY EVEN
THOUGH SO FAR IT HAS NOT HAD MUCH RESULT, AND MEANWHILE I CAN PUT UP WITH THE MOUNTING VOLUME OF CRITICISM.
S. BUT IN THIS CASE WE MUST KEEP THE THREAT OF A QUOTA IN EXISTENCE AND BE PREPARED TO APPLY IT QUICKLY IF REPRESENTATIONS SHOW NO RESULTS. TO UNDERLINE THE POSSIBILITY I WILL HAVE SOME GATES ERECTED ON THE BRIDGE, OSTENSIBLY FOR CROWD CONTROL. BUT IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS, ON THE ONE HAND A TRIGGER DATE FOR A QUOTA AS LATE AS OCTOBER (PEKING'S TEL UNDER REFERENCE, PARA 5) IS FAR TOO LATE TO COMMAND IMMEDIATE ATTENTION, BUT ON THE OTHER WE SHOULD AVOID BOXING OURSELVES IN WITH A PRECISE FIGURE LIKE
50 A DAY.
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