TNAG-0904-FCO40-1114-Immigration-from-China-to-Hong-Kong-1979 — Page 51

COONETEENTIANTIAL Page 2 of AUS(GS) 92/79

(D/DS6/46/66/^)

dated 14 March 1979

3. I know that the PR CANBERRA now in Hong dong, as

as the result of a request from the Governor for maritime reconnaissance while the RHKAA ISLANDER is grounded for maintenance, is being provided on an extra cost basis. This basis of cost was arrived at, I believe, taking account of the training value obtained from the deployment. In the case of the Royal Navy, I am sure we can draw a distinction between the temporary attachment of ships to the Hong Kong Squadron, and normal brief ship visits during which the unit(s) concerned operate with the Squadron en route to and/or from Hong Kong. In the former circumstances there is a case for the Hong Kong Government to meet 75% of the costs of as much of the deployment as can be attributed to its attachment to the Squadron.

4. What the Governor has in mind, in suggesting a possible temporary strengthening of the Army element of the garrison a few months hence, is not the result of a military (i.e. IS or border tension) threat to the colony, although the imposition of stricter border controls might create such tension. We must therefore look very hard at the case for providing an addi tional infantry battalion for a period of several months, and, should we accept that such an increment is necessary, then the financial basis on which it would be provided should be that the Hong Kong Government meet 75% of the full costs involved. This is not however the main aspect of the problem which is provision of additional manpower'.

5.

In this connection the role of the Services needs careful consideration. The Governor says that the main operational role of the Army and Navy has been to support the police in dealing with illegal immigration. This is a statement of fact related to the past few months but not a statement of policy. It is certainly arguable that illegal immigration is essentially a police matter, and if that force is not adequate it should be expanded. Any possible service assistance should be limited to an interim period while this is done. In this connection greater recourse should be made also to the Local Volunteer Force (to which the Governor also refers) before any reinforcerents are provided from UK or elsewhere.

6.

I understand that HE is inclined to the view that he should be able to "borrow" the Brunei battalion to provide the temporary increment he may require. This is not an option which is open to us. Although the exchange of letters accompanying the Treaty concluded with the Sultan states that:

"Her Majesty's Government will retain the right to

withdraw the hattalion temporarily to deal with contingencies elsewhere if this proves necessary.

ન

#1

during the negotiations last September in London, HMG advised Brunei that in practice this meant for emergencies in Hong Kong, and undertook that we would always consult with the Bruneis before withdrawing the Gurkhas. It is, of course, particularly relevant that there have been several landings or attempted landings by "boat people" from Vietnam on the Brunei coast, and it is most unlikely that the Sultan would look favourably on any suggestion that the Gurkha battalion should be taken away to assist the

CONFIDENTIAL ►

NTIAL

!