TNAG-0900-FCO40-1110-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 106

HKK 243

CONFIDENTIAL REY NO. 51

36. PA

[Acyon

DESK OFFICER INDEX

PA

1885

GR 390

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 30205OZ NOV 79

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 583 OF 30 NOVEMBER 1979.

INFO UKMIS GENEVA AND HONG KONG.

INFO SAVING JAKARTA, SINGAPORE, MANILA, BANGKOK, HANOI AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

1.

YOUR TELNO 659 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES MV ENTAL INA

See 1889

MURRAY ASKED FERNANDES (AUSTRALIAN DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER) TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS THE AUSTRALIAN REQUEST FOR A

GUARANTEE FOR THE 149 REFUGEES ON THE ENTALINA, HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT OUR ESTABLISHED PRACTICE TO GIVE GUARANTEES OF THE TYPE

WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD REQUESTED. OUR VIEW AS EXPRESSED AT GENEVA AND SUBSEQUENTLY WAS THAT REFUGEES ARRIVING AFTER RESCUE

AT SEA AT THE FIRST SUBSEQUENT SCHEDULED PORT OF CALL SHOULD NOT BE TREATED ANY DIFFERNTLY TO THOSE WHO HAD ARRIVED IN THEIR OWN BOATS, AND THAT IN ALL CASES WE ASKED THE STATE CONCERNED TO ALLOW REFUGEES RESCUED BY BRITISH FLAG VESSELS TO DISEMBARK WITHOUT SUCH A GUARANTEE. HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR MR MACKELLAR TO RECONSIDER THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF THE POST-GENEVA SITUATION, IN WHICH A NUMBER OF STATES, INCLUDING JAPAN, HAD AGREED TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FIRST PORT OF CALL. WE CONSIDERED

REQUESTS FOR GUARANTEES ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS AND RECOGNISED THAT MAJOR PLACES OF FIRST ASYLUM (EG HONG KONG) WERE IN A SPECIAL FOSITION. IF THE AUSTRALIAN REQUEST WAS MAINTAINED WE SHOULD HAVE

TO SEEK AUTHORITY AT A HIGH LEVEL AND IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING IT BEFORE THE ENTALINA REACHED DARWIN ON 4 DECEMBER. HE ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE AUSTRALIANS HAD ASKED FOR A GUARANTEE.

2.

FERNANDES SAID THAT HE DID NOT HOLD OUT MUCH PROSPECT OF MR MACKELLAR CHANGING HIS VIEW, WHICH HE WAS SURE HAD BEEN DETERMINED PRIMARILY BY DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS. HE AGREED TO REPORT THE REQUEST, AND NOTED THAT THERE WERE ALSO DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS DEHIND THE BRITISH POLICY.

CONFIDENTIAL

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