TNAG-0899-FCO40-1109-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 33

that if one member state were attacked and the other four thought that it could repulse the invader, then ASEAN support would be political and practical. But if military support were needed, the victim

of attack would receive this, even if a military offensive were required. Joint military exercises had already taken place. President Soeharto had spoken of the need for 'total military resilience'. Mr Simons said that, while ASEAN could play a role, and an ASEAN presence in the frontier area, if one were established, would have a certain deterrent effect, we should not over-estimate its military value. Mr Murray agreed but said that the fact that Soeharto had mentioned the point at all was encouraging. Mr Holbrooke considered that ASEAN Foreign Ministers ought to visit the frontier area. He confirmed that General Kriangsak had mentioned US obligations under the Manila Pact to him during his recent visit to Bangkok. INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES

15.

Mr Cortazzi thought that consideration might be given to involving other powers in developments in the ASEAN region

possibly

a group of neutrals such as the Swedes, Austrians and Swiss. Mr Holbrooke thought this could be useful, if the ASEAN countries judged it appropriate. But the Swedes, were always thinking of their ties with Hanoi and the Austrians and Swiss had so far had no experience in an observer role in ASEAN countries. Mr Cortazzi remarked that

judging by their draft resolution in the United Nations, the Indians could be something of a problem. The USSR might put pressure on the next Indian Government to give greater support to Hanoi. He would speak out firmly on this matter to the Indians when he went

to Delhi in December.

16. Mr Cortazzi said that, during Chairman Hua's recent visit to

London, he had emphasised the need to support all Cambodian forces opposed to Heng Samrin. Mrs Thatcher had spoken strongly to him on the subject of the Pol Pot regime. There was nothing that we could do to bring about a political settlement at this stage, except to advocate a neutral Cambodia, without the presence of either Vietnamese or Chinese troops.

THE DE-RECOGNITION OF POL POT

17. Mr Simons in answer to a question by Mir Holbrooke, explained that, while we had not exchanged diplomatic missions with the Fol Fot authorities with whom we were in diplomatic relations, we did receive

official communications from them. We had been the first to condenn

5.

CONFIDENTIAL

/Pol Pot's