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Bangladesh. He added, having learnt that the British Heads of Missions meeting in January 1980 was to be in Bangkok, that in his view, there would be great benefit in informing Kri angsak that the venue had been selected as an indication of British
support for Thailand; the Americans had taken the same line in 1979 with their Heads of Missions meeting, and Kriangsak had met the participants. Mr Holbrooke added, with reference to a possible negotiation over Cambodia, that he had been greatly struck to see the high regard in which Cambodian refugees held Prince Sihanouk contrary to the view of US intelligence agencies that Sihanouk's role had been eroded. Sihanouk evidently had great potential.
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Mr Blaker commented that when he had been in Cambodia, Sihanouk had polled 98 per cent of the vote in free elections. was unlikely that the peasants would vote very differently now, if they had the chance. Sihanouk was the best candidate for the top job. Mr Simons said that Sihanouk had spoken of visiting London from Paris, to call on Mr Malcolm MacDonald. Mr Blaker said that, in that case, he would like to meet Sihanouk. In Mr Holbrooke's view, Sihanouk had been mistaken in spending so much time in China. He needed to bear in mind that Cambodia would have to live with the Vietnamese as well as the Chinese, if there were to be the hope that Vietnamese troops would be withdrawn.
Announcement of British De-recognition of Pol Pot
12. In discussion of a draft passage to be included in a speech during the adjournment debate which could take place on 22 November, Mr Holbrooke proposed that, to counter-balance the reference to de-recognition, a section should be added strongly supporting Thailand and ASEAN; the argument could also be used, that after de-recognition, the British position would be no different from that of the Americans. Mr Holbrooke also suggested that the ASEAN countries, the Chinese, Vietnamese and Russians should also be told that the British move in no way represented a move towards condoning the Vietnamese attack. Special countervailing action vis-a-vis the Thais was needed. US Policy to Thailand
13. Mr Holbrooke listed the following package of measures which
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