TNAG-0898-FCO40-1108-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 105

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We cannot guarantee, even now.

that this will be the final figure. There are considerable difficulties in estimating because of assumptions about the rate of resettlement (which is not within our control); and the estimate could be significantly affected by whether additional numbers have to be looked after in large camps or the smaller centres opened by the voluntary refugee bodies. There is no slack for contingencies in the estimate, and no provision for financial assistance towards permanent resettlement a matter on which we are coming under increasing pressure from the local authority associations. The latest estimate also leaves out of account the cost of dealing with any new groups of refugees who may be picked up at sea by British ships and for whom we may have to give a guarantee of resettlement.

In his letter of 24 September the Chief Secretary indicated that an increase in the relevant cash limit would be permitted, and that the amount of the extra provision over the £1m originally contained in the Vote should not exceed £lm. We shall need, in practice, an addition of at least £1.5m in 1979/80 to the limit of £2m which the Chief Secretary envisaged at that time.

You will be glad to hear that we do not think that this additional £1.5m need be met from the Contingency Reserve. Since I spoke to you, I have been told that we should be able to find the money within the cash limit on the HO2 cash block. Cearly, things may change, but that is our best estimate based on the latest FIS returns.

We propose, therefore, subject to your agreement, to put in a supplementary estimate of £3.5m (at current prices) comprising £2m envisaged in the Chief Secretary's letter of 24 September with the balance being found from within the HO2 cash block.

There may also be sufficient room left within the cash limit block to contemplate a faster rate of intake, which would enable us to meet the considerable diplomatic pressures for a quick start in accepting the 10,000 quota which we agreed to in Geneva. The Governor of Hong Kong has told us that he would be helped very considerably if we could take as many as 700-1,000 a month between October-December instead of the 500 a month for which we are currently planning. Not the least of his motives is to influence the United States and Canada to take much larger numbers from Hong Kong. The United States and Canada have made it clear that their attitude will be influenced by the UK Government's performance in meeting its own commitments. There are signs that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees may want to apply pressure for a faster rate of intake. There is considerable domestic interest in bringing the refugees from Hong Kong here as quickly as possible. There are also and perhaps more importantly UK policy advantages in going as fast as we reasonably can. The longer refugees remain in Hong Kong there is the risk of greater resettlement problems when they arrive here particularly given the appalling conditions in which they are housed in Hong Kong and ? their reliably reported exposure there to criminal elements which include

drug traffickers, secret societies and the like. We do not want to be alarmist whom? but there could be very serious implications if this kind of thing gets a hold.

Our present estimate is that the total cost of accepting the Governor of Hong Kong's proposals at current prices would be £4.2m in 1979/80. This estimate, of course, is subject to the same qualifications as that for meeting our minimum public obligations. This would represent an additional £2.2m over the £2m originally envisaged by the Chief Secretary. Here again, we should hope to meet the cost within our cash limits. At this stage, however,

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