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including the Asian Development Bank as well as EEC food aid.
iii) Non-aligned. We should try to persuade as many of the non-aligned as possible to take a firm line with the Vietnamese at the Non-aligned Summit in Havana. We should point out that the Vietnamese undertakings at Geneva were the result of inter- national pressure and that if this were reduced Vietnamese policies of racial discrimination and persecution would be likely to be intensified leading to a further exodus.
iv) Information. We should keep up a flow of information about Vietnamese policies to ensure that Vietnamese propaganda is effectively answered. This will have to be primarily information
obtained from refugees, and we shall need to rely largely on Hong Kong as a source.
c) Cambodia. A political solution to the problem of Cambodia will be extremely difficult to find. The following are possibilities:-
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i) UN Security Council. We could appeal to the UN Security Council on the grounds that the situation there poses a threat to peace and security in South East Asia and especially to Thailand. There could well be enough ASEAN and non-aligned support for such an approach, but any effective resolution is liable to attract a Soviet veto and a wet resolution acceptable to all would be of little or no value. It might however be possible to achieve a resolution appointing a UN envoy or even a group of neutral countries to study the situation and eport, but this latter would be more difficult as such a group would probably be unacceptable to the Vietnamese and volunteers might not be forthcoming.
The
ii) A special conference. We considered last week whether we should call for a special conference but decided that the time was not ripe. In amy case we had not thought through the questions of participation and objectives. most difficult issue would be which Cambodian regime (Pol Pot or Heng Samrin) or both to invite, but there would be other difficulties; apart from ourselves, the French, the Americans and the ASEAN countries, China, Vietnam, Laos, Australia and Japan would also no doubt wish to participate, and there would be the question of Soviet participation. The objectives would have to be to find a way of stopping the fighting, relieving the famine` and finding a means of
/reconciling
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