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VSOs as a means of supplementing Government help, although this would probably mean additional ODA funding.
iv) Shipping. Developments in Geneva may mean that this is not going to be as serious a problem as we expected especially if the principle of first asylum is adhered to. We should emphasise the importance of this principle and should continue to take the line that each case where British ships picks up refugees at sea will be treated on its merits.
v) Vietnam's agreement with the UNHCR. We need to ensure that movements from Vietnam do not prejudice resettlement from countries of first asylum.
b) Pressure on Vietnam. This calls for action under the following headings, but we should be ready to reassess the position in the light of the extent to which Vietnam carries out its undertakings and improves its human rights performance:-
i) UN. We should try to ensure that the report on the Vietnamese refugee situation and debate on it is high on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in the autumn. There would be no advantage in Security Council action at present over refugees from Vietnam. The Secretary of State agreed last week that we should not seek such
action unless we could be sure of maximum ASEAN and non-aligned support, and the ASEAN countries probably want to wait and see if the Vietnamese live up to their assurances.
ii) Aid to Vietnam. We must try to ensure that aid to Vietnam continues to be restricted. We should have further discussions on this with the Japanese and the Scandinavians, pointing out that they should not increase aid until it is clear how the Vietnamese are going to perform. We must watch aid through international agencies, including the Asian Development Bank. We should continue to press for the diversion of EEC food aid to Vietnamese refugees in South East Asia.
iii) Non-aligned. We should try to persuade as many of the non-aligned as possible to take a firm line with the Vietnamese at the Non-Aligned Summit in
•Havana. We should point out that the Vietnamese undertakings at Geneva were the result of inter- national pressure and that if this were reduced
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