because of a veto.
CONFIDENTIAL 5.
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
14.
ECOSOC is currently meeting in Geneva from 4 July to 3 August. Several delegations including the UK, have referred to the Indo-China
refugee problem in their opening statements. It would be feasible to
call for a duscussion when the UNHCR Annual Report comes before the
meeting - towards the end of the session. The presentation of UNHCR
report is normally a routine affair. The report is simly transmitted
to the General Assembly for consideration.
15. Mr Hartling, the UNHCR, has told Mr Hurd that he feared such
discussion at ECOSOC of the Indo-China refugee problem would set an unwelcome precedent: since all refugee problems were to some degree
political, his annual report might in future become a regular focus for political controversy. Mr Hartling personally wished to avoid becoming involved in such controversy.
16. Discussion of the problem in ECOSOC might well, as Mr Hartling also commented, be something of an anti-climax so soon after the
meeting on 20-21 July.
Action in Geneva
17. The Delegation should keep in close touch with the French and
US Delegations, especially on the question of Security Council action.
The US wish to avoid a Security Council debate in their Residency,
ie. after 31 July. The general attitude of the non-aligned is also
important, although their attendance will be uneven. The Delegation
should keep in contact in particular with India and Yugoslavia; and with Norway and Portugal, the WEOG non-permanent members of the Security
Council. The Australian working paper may form a basis for action with
the ASEAN countries. Among them, Singapore is the most outspokenly
hostile to Vietnam (and the least directly affected). Thailand is
naturally directly concerned over the threat of clashes across its
border with Kampuchea. Malaysia has the acutest Chinese minority
problem. Indonesia (particularly the military element in Government)
is inclined to be less anti-Vietnamese than anti-Chinese. The
Philippines have maintained a low profile so far.
UK Vietnam Political Relations
18.
UK Bilateral political relations with Vietnam have already
deteriorated to the level of the mutual rejection of strongly worded
CONFIDENTIAL
/formal
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