TNAG-0894-FCO40-1104-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 73

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3.

Prospects

7.

In practice, the views of the seven non-aligned Council members

are of great importance. They are reluctant to become involved in

anything which looks like an East/West and/or Soviet/Chinese

confrontation. In the case of the Indo-Chinese refugees, they and

other Council members would be influenced by the views of the countries

of the region. In any approach to the Security Council in relation to

Indo-China, the attitude of the ASEAN countries would, therefore, be

important. For there to be a chance of a satisfactory outcome, it

should be clear that any initiative had ASEAN backing. In present

circumstances however, and even with ASEAN support it will not be easy

to muster nine votes. The non-aligned are badly divided over

Kampuchea and the Vietnamese role there; and may prefer a quite life

until the Havana Summit (3-8 September). France also shows signs of

wishing to develop an identifiable line more friendly to Vietnam that

other leading Western countries, and may be unreliable in support.

8. To maximise the chances of getting the Council to meet, it would

be better that the UK should not alone take the initiative in calling

for Security Council discussion (in February 1979, we did so with the

Americans, Norwegians and Portuguese and with tacit ASEAN backing).

In addition, non-aligned backing is useful (in January the Council

concentrated on a non-aligned draft resolution). The Soviet Union

has twice this year vetoed non-aligned and ASEAN Security Council

resolutions dealing with Indo-China which were disagreeable to the

Vietnamese. The chance of securing adoption of any resolution would

be in inverse proportion to the extent that it allocates blame to

Vietnam.

Special Sessions of the General Assembly

9.

Article 20 of the United Nations' Charter lays down that:

"The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or a majority of

a majority of the members of the United Nations

There have been several special sessions on various topics including the Middle East (1967), development and international economic co- operation (1975) and disarmament (1978). All of these followed an affirmative majority in the General Assembly, where the danger of a

/veto

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