TNAG-0893-FCO40-1103-Refugees-from-Vietnam-in-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-boat-people-1979 — Page 56

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

CONFIDENTIAL

3.

4.

I commented as follows on Mr Mayne's points:-

a) We should work in the couloirs in Geneva to get a consensus on follow-up action. An early statement by the interested parties, including the ASEANS, after the conclusion of the UN conference about further moves was desirable.

b) I stressed the vital importance of getting non- aligned support, and told him about our representations to the Indians, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans.

c) I expressed sincere doubts about the idea of processing centres within Vietnam. I thought that this would lead the Vietnamese to dump the bulk of the population they did not want into UN-run camps, thus passing to the United Nations the burden of feeding a part of their population. I suggested that the establishment of such camps in Vietnam might encourage rather than discourage the exodus. I was inclined to favour the development of camps outside Vietnam. But Mr Maynes rightly pointed out that camps outside would mean the continuation of an exodus in small boats with consequent dangers to life at sea. As for the refugees paying for themselves, this might be all right for some, especially the middle-class Chinese, but there was an increasing proportion of Vietnamese who were leaving Vietnam because of the appalling treatment they were receiving at the hands of the Vietnamese Government. We mustn't do anything which would condone such treatment.

[

Sir A Parsons stressed the importance of deciding in advance what we wanted to come out of any meeting held under UN auspices. It was no good going to the UN with half-baked ideas or in the vague hope that something would come out of a discussion. Both Mr Maynes and I fully endorsed this, and we agreed that these ideas should be pursued further at our meeting on Wednesday, 11 July, with the Australians, Canadians and French.

5. I asked Mr Maynes whether Mr Vance would be going to Geneva. He thought it most unlikely that in present circumstances Mr Vance would not go. US public opinion would not understand it, unless there were other vital matters which he had to deal with. This reinforces the desirability of the Secretary of State attending at least the opening session.

PS/Mr Blaker

West Collage.

A

HAH Gortazzi

PS/PUS

Sir A Duff Planning Staff

9 July 1979

Сс

Šir A Parsons

HKGD

SEAD UND

FED

PS PS/LPS

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