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wever a danger that such reluctance would be taken by the Vietnamese as acceptance of their attitude towards the refugee problem. Nevertheless he was inclined to think that, if there was only a single conference, then this would detract from resettlement offers. Furthermore, the UNHCR would be reluctant to get involved in anything with heavy political overtones. In further discussion Mr Oakley said that the US Delegation in New York thought that the Security Council could be used as a means of putting pressure on Vietnam Article 34 could be used to cover the present situation because it had arisen from fighting in Cambodia and Laos. Mr Holbrooke had discussed this with Mr Young in New York the previous day.
8. Mr Christopher agreed that a separation of the two objectives of resettlement and political condemnation was attractive.
If they were taken together people would think that condemnation alone was enough.. He thought it necessary to accept the facts of what was now happening to deal with this reality. Even if previous conferences had not been successful there was no reason not to try again. The US had welcomed Mrs Thatcher's initiative. US policy towards a conference had not yet been formalised but he thought it was tending towards de-linking the two objectives. He thought it might also be right to de-emphasise the aspect of condemning Vietnam. Mr Holbrooke said that he envisaged a scenario over the coming months as follows: first what President Carter had said to Mr Brezhnev at Vienna, then the Tokyo summit followed by the Bali meeting, then add in a possible meeting of the Security Council and as soon as possible, a conference on resettlement. He would like to arrange to speak to the Governor again before he went to see Waldheim. The Americans were encouraged by Waldheim's new sense of dynamism (exemplified by his action on Cyprus) and wanted to capitalise on it.
9.
Mr Christopher commented that the Governor's visit had shown the urgency of the problem. He thought there was a new receptiveness to this view in the United States. Messrs Clark and Holbrooke confirmed that there was a growing feeling in Congress that the US should do more. This was however at present more apparent amongst those dealing with foreign affairs than those on the Appropriations Committee. Mr Holbrooke said there was also feeling in Congress that Japan and Scandinavia should do much more. To a lesser extent this applied also to the UK. The Governor explained that the UK record on refugees was very good. Since 1967 the UK had taken about 1.6 million people as a result of Britain's own historical links. There was an annual intake of about 40,000.
Resettlement from Hong Kong
10. Finally, the Governor said that he would like to emphasise the importance of the offtake from Hong Kong being proportionate to intake. So far this year Hong Kong had received about 32% of boat regugees: offtake had only been 12% of the total for the region, and he reminded Mr Clark of the assurances he had given in Hong Kong. Mr Clark confirmed that the American approach was to be flexible and to match offtake to arrivals. They were at present doing their sums and would re-adjust month by month. They did however feel a particular sense of obligation towards those now in Thailand who had formerly worked with the United States in Laos. This committment would have to be reflected in the overall quotas.
Distribution:
UKMIS, New York
UKMIS, Geneva
Political Adviser, Hong Kong Chancery, Hanoi
Mr Cortazzi, FCO Mr Murray, FCO SEAD, FCO
UN Dept, FCO FED, FCO HKGD, FCO
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