14
Use of Vietnamese territory and facilities gives the
Soviet an increased reconnaissance and intelligence collection
capability, primarily against China but also against U.S. and
other military forces in the area. This is a source of serious
concern to us and to most Asian countries, not only militarily
but because of the dangers to the region from increased great
power rivalry and the consequent risk of increasing tensions.
As the Subcommittee is aware, the Vietnamese and Chinese
recently concluded a first round of negotiations in Hanoi aimed
at settling their differences. We found the agreement to talk
a hopeful sign, but the talks failed to move the two sides
toward any sort of accommodation. Vietnam has stressed limited
measures to stabilize the border mutual withdrawal of forces
from the border region, creation of a demilitarized zone and
prisoner exchanges while making only passing reference
to the broader range of SRV-PRC relations. The Chinese, for
their part, have insisted instead that "crucial and fundamental
problems", such as Vietnamese ties to the Soviet Union,
Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea and Laos and conflicting claims
in the Paracels and Spratlys, will have to be resolved before
relations can be improved. Although discussions are likely
to resume later this month in Beijing, the underlying differences
in the Vietnamese and Chinese positions appear to offer little
hope for rapid resolution. It would appear that, over the
near term at least, Chinese-Vietnamese relations will be marked
by acrimony, distrust, and indirect combat, such as that
taking place in Kampuchea, but that a second major round of
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