Very few
esettlement, it would be essential for each country who wanted to help to take a specific number of refugees. Mr Murray said that in this we should clearly need to be guided by the expertise of the High Commissioner for Refugees. Mr Heidler said everything depended on the determination of governments.
If some governments were prepared to discuss resettlement figures with the aim of arriving at a a total of about quarter of a million, would the UK be part of that? Unless this happens, there would be very little prospect of success. governments, he noted, were willing to go down that road. He added, however, that the High Commissioner had the impression that the UK might be prepared to do so, in which case this was good. But, if not, then there had to be sceptecism. Mr Murray took note. Britain he said could hardly give an answer to that question without knowing what the rest of the world were prepared to do. This was a matter we would need to consider further and possibly discuss with the UN High Commission for Refugees and with Dr Waldheim. We would, however, wish to see how the preparations for the Conference were going. We were still in the very early stages. Mr Heidler said there would certainly be a solution if enough governments were prepared to play the numbers'game and accept specific quotas of refugees, to be agreed at
refugees, to be agreed at the Conference. to cover the whole resettlement need. Governments would also need to be prepared to put up enough money. In addition, if Governments in South East Asia would accept that not every one in the camps could be moved (and consequently would have to be settled locally), then all these things. together would solve the problem of those in the camps now and of of those to come in the future.
8.
some
Mr Heidler said that if we could create in the minds of the Government of Vietnam that there was an alternative to pushing their people out on small boats, then there might well be a good chance to solve this problem. Mr Murray said the moderation of the present Vietnamese policies was a prerequisite to a durable solution.
Mr Heidler said he was thinking more in terms of direct flights from Vietnam for the people who wanted to leave, if Governments agreed to accept them. Then
Then the refugees might be prepared to wait in Vietnam. Mr Murray said that this path would only be open to the refugees in Vietnam if pressure from the Vietnamese Government was eased. Mr Heidler said that no-one would argue that pressure on the people of Vietnam should not be reduced. But even if it were not reduced, the people concerned would surely wait a little while before leaving the country. Mr Murray said that, in his view, the people now under pressure from Vietnamese policies had no choice in the matter. Mr Heidler agreed they had no free choice but did not believe it would be impossible for most of them to delay their departures for three ог four weeks at least. Mr Murray said he was not able to agree. He could not judge the matter subjectively in this way.
9.
Mr Heidler concluded by saying that he was very happy to see a Government taking a greater interest in the displacement of persons than the United Nations itself. In thanking Mr Heidler for his call, Mr Murray said the discussion had been most useful. There was much food for thought in what Mr Heidler had said which would be given very careful consideration.
10% The meeting closed at 5.20 pm.
Both agreed to keep in touch.
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT
7 June, 1979
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